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Abstract 
The purpose of this paper to examines the impact of corporate governance on firm’s performance for listed 
companies of Fuel and Power. In this paper we analyzed the corporate governance such as board size, board 
independence block holders on firm performance (ROE, ROA, Tobin’s Q, Firm Size and leverage). It covers the 
study for the period of 2010-2014 with 15 listed companies of Fuel and Power in KSE using linear regression 
analysis. The empirical findings show a firm size and leverage is significant effect with corporate governance and 
also positive association between board of independence and firm’s performance. The research has been limited 
to some selected fuel and power sector companies focus on the comparison of corporate governance 2002 and 
2012. This paper suggests the reforms of corporate governance in Pakistan companies or firms especially in board 
size and block holders should be promoted to the other sectors. 
Keywords: Corporate Governance, Fuel and Power Sectors, Karachi Stock Exchange 
 
1.0    Introduction 
Good corporate governance always presents to be maintained at a certain level of economic development by 
intensify the corporate performance and become their entrance to exterior resources. In developing markets good 
corporate governance assist to achieve the guidelines of number of goals. It decreases at risk of the financial 
catastrophe, decreasing the transaction cost and cost of capital. Corporate governance always promotes 
relationship of the management and BOD and they always try to better governance in the future. In Pakistan, the 
publicizing of the SECP Code of Corporate Governance 2012 promulgate the some important points to the listed 
companies as well as the other firms whose directly or indirectly included in the corporate sector in Pakistan. 
We try to find out the association betwixt corporate governance and firm performance in energy and 
power sectors, whether they are giving the good result or not in the current situation.  Corporate governance is 
mechanism by which all the firms are interconnected to each other, they examined the management whether they 
perform the work on time or they better organized the BOD whereas they are always liable for the governance of 
their decisions. The block holders are appoint the directors and the auditors and to convince them to better 
governance in the region. 
In broad sense stakeholders such as suppliers and employees will favor to being to be involved in to 
business association with well-control companies, since outcome the associations are likely to be more flourishing 
financially, equitable and extended to lasting measure with association with companies where corporate 
governance practices are not having enough of a specified quality. They will also benefit from less risk and the 
enhance wealth formation of the company.  
Some researcher argument about corporate governance such as (Berle and Means, 1932); and Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976) corporate governance assumes underlying tenseness between stockholders and the managers who 
they participate in the business. However, (Fama and Jensen, 1983) Observing the individualistic and participate 
BOD convince that comptroller attitude in the foremost attentiveness of the stake holders. 
The empirical evidence shows with the large number of learning record a noteworthy pessimistic relation 
between BS and CF. According to dominant intellects who have insist that board size at least 8 or 9 (Lipton and 
Lorsch, 1992; and Jensen, 1993) for every one of the organizations. However, a various number of the latest 
research papers (Lehn et al., 2004; Boone et al., 2007;Coles et al., 2008; Guest,2008; and Linck et al., 2008) exhibit 
that Tobin’s Q, profitability and firm size are the part of the board size which is confirmed by the more variables 
who relate with the extra firms. 
Corporate Governance ameliorates with the initiation Corporate Governance Ordinance in 2002. There is 
very short task to analyze the relationship between corporate governance and their stake holder depiction in the 
Pakistan. The literature on corporate governance focus on the topic of stock holder congruence, whereas 
shareholder who relates with a family or a person or worker or manager or financial institution or foreign enterprise 
that indication is how much shareholder retains the shares.  
Numerous empirical studies have opinion upon the momentousness of independent directors to favorable 
result of a firm. According to (Elloumi and Gueyié, 2001) opinions that the firms have excessive number of 
independent directors have resulted slightly persistent to financial pressure in a board. According to Lasfer (2002), 
Coles et al. (2004) and Pass (2004) assert that the size of the firm pertinent to influence on board independence.  
In additional, small firms are better significant influence on firm’s performance for board independence however, 
large firms to have much multiplex influence of board independence on performance that possibility of unable to 
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see or be seen clearly. 
 
2.0    Research Problem 
The study problem is to examine that:  
• How board independence, board size and block holder’s impact on Firm’s Performance? 
• What is the association betwixt corporate governance and firm’s performance? 
 
2.1    Research Objective 
• To find out the influence of board independence, board size and block holders on firm performance of 
fuel and power sectors. 
• To find out the association betwixt corporate governance and firm’s performance. 
 
2.2    Research Scope 
This research will focus particularly Fuel and Power Sector which is listed in KSE-100 through 2010-2014 and 
they focus on the previous researches with the verification regarding corporate governance on firm’s performance. 
 
3.0    Literature Review 
Corroboration from prior research studies from academic literature have tried to found out verifies clout of 
corporate governance on a firm’s performance. A literature review of the following characteristics covered to 
corporate governance such as board size, independent directors and block holders.   
A research framework is given below in figure: 
 
1)     Board Size and Firm Performance: 
An interrelation in the middle of board size and a firm’s performance, a small group of point of view of notion 
gives argues with ground basis. The first point of view that a small board size will give additional opulence to the 
firm (Lipton and Lorsch, 1992; Jensen, 1993; Yermack, 1996) along with this support by numerous viewpoint of 
thoughts also, further thought examine that a great size of board will increase a firm’s opulence ( Pfeffer, 1972; 
Klein, 1998; Coles and ctg, 2008).Coles et al.(2008) find out i.e., few other internal elements influence in the firm 
resulting gives the pessimistic tie-up of board size accompanied by firm achievement.  
According to Hermalin and Weisbach (2003) argue that board size and firm value are pessimistic 
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Lipton and Lorsch (1992) assert that optimum level in a size of board at least 8 or 9. However, Dahya and 
McConnell (2007), and Wintoki, Linck and Netter (2012), find out the board size and firm performance are not 
link there. Our research manoeuver a specimen of 75 observations over the period 2010–2014 and find out the 
impact of Board Size in Fuel and Power sector stipulate that the out-turn of board size on firm opulence is 
insignificantly pessimistic especially in countries where weaker governance. 
2)     Board Independence and Firm Performance: 
Some researcher significant arguments upon the board independence, such as first argued that few figure of board 
members can swell footprint on independence of board (Berle and Means, 1932; Solomon, 2010; Chen, 2011; Al-
Janadi et al., 2013).A higher quality model of stakeholders to furnish the associates of independent board that they 
can ameliorate the worth of good governance. (Clarke, 1998; Solomon, 2010).Haniffa and Cooke (2002) and 
Barako et al. (2006) avow that their grasp and proficiency given by independent directors that could encouragement 
to the board and their committees. 
Assorted achievements of board and firm regarding segment of non-executive director research 
affirmation. According to Fosberg (1989); Hermalin and Weisbach (1991); Bhagat and Black (2002) and 
Abdelsalam, Masry and Elsegini (2008) assert that fraction of independent directors and firm performance have 
no alliance it measures, especially in weaker countries where weaker governance .Our research using a sample of 
75 observations over the period 2010–2014 and investigate the valuation impacts of independent directors in Fuel 
and Power sector indicate that the consequence of independent directors on firm wealth is noteworthy positive. 
3)     Block holders and Firm Performance: 
Block holders are shareholders who lean to have a big portion of the company’s shares as compared to other 
shareholders. In particular, block holders play momentum role in any firm along with corporate governance should 
be focus on the required adroitness and time to firm’s accomplishment. According to Denis and McConnell (2003), 
Becker et al. (2011) avow that, concentrating on relating to managerial power may impact on block holding to 
accomplishment the firm’s performance. Demsetz and Lehn (1985) avow that block holder to give intellectual 
benefit for the purpose of limit the allocating of controlling the firm wealth. Also, block holder alleviate the wealth 
of management and through the investiture ameliorate the productivity of the firm (Jensen (1986)). 
According to Villalonga and Amit (2006) specify that block-holders’ ownership is negatively correlation 
with firm accomplishment, and also Lefort and Urzúa (2008) point out that firm performance and block holder is 
negatively correlated to each other. Belkhir (2009) also argues that block-holders’ ownership and firm performance 
an opposite direction to each other. 
 
4.0    METHODOLOGY 
This research using a sample of 75 observations over the period 2010–2014 and investigate the valuation impacts 
of block holders in Fuel and Power sector indicate that the outcome of block holder on firm wealth is insignificantly 
negative. 
1)    Hypothesis  
On the basis of above study the following hypotheses have been developed: 
H1: Corporate governance does not influence on ROE  
H2: Corporate governance does not influence on ROA 
H3: Corporate governance does not influence on TQ 
H4: Corporate governance influence on FS 
H5: Corporate governance influence on LEV 
2)    Data Collection Method:   
Secondary data is gathered from the Analysis of Balance sheet, Report of SBP of Joint stock companies listed of 
fuel and power on Karachi Stock Exchange-100, and annual reports of the listed companies of fuel and power 
sector. 
3)    Analysis of Data Tool:  
We have look over our data by using E-views software. 
4)    Specification of Model: 
These models are used to test the hypothesis 
The following five models will be used to test the research hypotheses:  
ROE = β0 + β1 (BI) + β2 (BS) + β3 (BH) + ε ...............................................(1). 
ROA= β0 + β1 (BI) + β2 (BS) + β3 (BH) + ε................................................(2). 
TQ= β0 + β1 (BI) + β2 (BS) + β3 (BH) + ε...................................................(3). 
FS= β0 + β1 (BI) + β2 (BS) + β3 (BH) + ε ...................................................(4). 
LEV= β0 + β1 (BI) + β2 (BS) + β3 (BH) + ε ..................................................(5). 
5)    Research Variables  
Dependent Variables 
ROE: Return on Equity of the Fuel and Power Sectors 
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ROA: Return on Assets of the Fuel and Power Sectors 
TQ: Tobin’s Q of the Fuel and Power Sectors 
FS: Firm Size of the Fuel and Power Sectors 
LEV: Leverage of the Fuel and Power Sectors 
Independent Variable 
BI: Board Independence of the Fuel and Power Sectors  
BS: Board Size of the Fuel and Power Sectors 
BH: Block Holder of the Fuel and Power Sectors  
ε: The error term. 
β0: Constant 
 
6.0)    Results and Discussion: 
Table-01.Multiple Regressions. 
V Coeft. Std. Er      t-Stat Prob.   
C 24.02831 3.895310 6.168523 0.0000 
BI 6.640713 8.211437 0.808715 0.4214 
BS -4.699909 5.094776 -0.922496 0.3594 
BH -47.81889 27.70524 -1.725987 0.0887 
R2 0.064544     M.D.V 20.82160 
Adj. R2 0.025018     S.D.D.V 13.64583 
S.E.O.R 13.47405     A.I.C 8.091267 
S2-res 12890.05     S.C 8.214866 
Log lik-li -299.4225     H-Q.C 8.140619 
F-stat. 1.632942     D-W.S 0.920947 
Prob(F-stat.) 0.189419    
 
Analysis: 
ROE dependents on BI, BS and BH or other 6.45% fluctuation of ROE can be explained by three variables such 
as BI, BS and BH. These independent variables can influence 6.45% only on ROE and rest of percentage 
fluctuation on ROE i.e., means outside independent variables that influence on 93.55% but inside factor can be 
influence on 6.45% so that means dependent and independent variable are not relate each other. We found from 
the multiple linear regressions that all the independent variables shows insignificant effect on dependent variable 
and also +ve sign indicates a direct relationship between BI with ROE, but overall F-Stats shows .189 which means 
0.189419 >.05. So, this is insignificant. 
Therefore, the return on assets impacts on Fuel and Power Sectors. The following equation has been made after 
the outcomes of the model research testing: 
ROE = 24.02831 +6.640*BI-4.699*BS-47.818*BH + ε 
Table-02.Multiple Regressions 
V Coeft. Std. Er      t-Stat Prob.   
C 6.865569 2.068055 3.319820 0.0014 
BI 21.64582 4.359525 4.965179 0.0000 
BS -1.549174 2.704862 -0.572737 0.5686 
BH -5.281498 14.70896 -0.359067 0.7206 
R2 0.271194     M.D.V 9.763600 
Adj. R2 0.240399     S.D.D.V 8.207777 
S.E.O.R 7.153494     A.I.C 6.824937 
S2-res 3633.246     S.C 6.948537 
Log lik-li -251.9351     H-Q.C 6.874289 
F-stat. 8.806538     D-W.S 0.499887 
Prob(F-stat.) 0.000049    
 
Analysis: 
ROA dependents on BI, BS and BH or other 27.11% fluctuation of ROA can be explained by three variables such 
as BI, BS and BH. These independent variables can influence 27.11% only on ROA and rest of percentage 
fluctuation on ROA i.e., means outside independent variables that influence on 72.81% but inside factor can be 
influence on 27.11% so that means dependent and independent variable are not relate each other. We found from 
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the multiple linear regressions that the significant effect of BI on ROA which means .000 < .05 and also the +ve 
sign indicates a direct relationship between BI with ROA, but overall F-Stats shows .000049 which means 
0.000049 < .05 so, this is significant. 
Therefore, the return on assets impacts on Fuel and Power Sectors. The following equation has been made after 
the outcomes of the model research testing: 
ROA = 6.865+21.645*BI-1.549*BS-5.281*BH + ε 
Table-03.Multiple Regressions. 
V Coeft. Std. Er      t-Stat Prob.   
C 0.868388 1.208487 0.718574 0.4748 
BI 3.540978 2.547530 1.389965 0.1689 
BS 0.082117 1.580612 0.051953 0.9587 
BH -2.671274 8.595321 -0.310782 0.7569 
R2 0.032355     M.D.V 1.539359 
Adj. R2 -0.008531     S.D.D.V 4.162495 
S.E.O.R 4.180212     A.I.C 5.750460 
S2-res 1240.666     S.C 5.874059 
Log lik-li -211.6422     H-Q.C 5.799811 
F-stat. 0.791347     D-W.S 0.062912 
Prob(F-stat.) 0.502724    
 
Analysis: 
TQ dependents on BI, BS and BH or other 3.235% fluctuation of TQ can be explained by three variables such as 
BI, BS and BH. These independent variables can influence 3.235% only on TQ and rest of percentage fluctuation 
on TQ i.e., means outside independent variables that influence on 96.765% but inside factor can be influence on 
3.235% so that means dependent and independent variable are not relate each other. We found from the multiple 
linear regressions that all the independent variables shows insignificant effect on dependent variable and also +ve 
sign indicates a direct relationship between BI and BS with TQ, but overall F-Stats shows .5027 which means 
0.5027 >.05. So, this is insignificant. 
Therefore, the Tobin’s Q impacts on Fuel and Power Sectors. The following equation has been made after 
the outcomes of the model research testing: 
TQ = .8683 +3.540*BI-.0821*BS-2.671*BH + ε 
Table-04.Multiple Regressions. 
V Coeft. Std. Er      t-Stat Prob.   
C 8.089770 0.092493 87.46405 0.0000 
BI 0.789382 0.194977 4.048588 0.0001 
BS -0.614774 0.120973 -5.081895 0.0000 
BH -2.991282 0.657849 -4.547061 0.0000 
R2 0.474372     M.D.V 7.731733 
Adj. R2 0.452162     S.D.D.V 0.432252 
S.E.O.R 0.319936     A.I.C 0.610465 
S2-res 7.267480     S.C 0.734065 
Log lik-li -18.89245     H-Q.C 0.659817 
F-stat. 21.35882     D-W.S 0.779820 
Prob(F-stat.) 0.000000    
 
Analysis: 
FS dependents on BI, BS and BH or other 47.43% fluctuation of FS can be explained by three variables such as 
BI, BS and BH. These independent variables can influence 47.43% only on FS and rest of percentage fluctuation 
on FS i.e., means outside independent variables that influence on 52.57% but inside factor can be influence on 
47.43% so that means dependent and independent variable are satisfactory relate to each other. We found from the 
multiple linear regressions that the significant effect of BI, BS and BH on FS which means .000 < .05 and also the 
+ve sign indicates a direct relationship between BI with FS, but overall F-Stats shows .0000 which means 0.0000 
< .05 so, this is significant. 
Therefore, the firm size impacts on Fuel and Power Sectors. The following equation has been made after the 
outcomes of the model research testing: 
FS = 8.089+.789*BI-.614*BS-2.991*BH + ε 
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LEV dependents on BI, BS and BH or other 16.38% fluctuation of LEV can be explained by three variables such 
as BI, BS and BH. These independent variables can influence 16.38% only on LEV and rest of percentage 
fluctuation on LEV i.e., means outside independent variables that influence on 83.62% but inside factor can be 
influence on 16.38% so that means dependent and independent variable are not relate each other. We found from 
the multiple linear regressions that the significant effect of BI and BH on LEV which means .0353< .05, .0014< .05 
and also the +ve sign indicates a direct relationship between BS with LEV, but overall F-Stats shows .00511 which 
means 0.005113 < .05 so, this is significant. 
Therefore, the Leverage impacts on Fuel and Power Sectors. The following equation has been made after the 
outcomes of the model research testing: 
LEV = 13.700-12.888*BI+3.826*BS-67.435*BH + ε 
Correlation Results: 
 ROE ROA TQ FS LEV BI BS BH 
ROE  1.000000  0.681676 -0.367204  0.407967  0.512761  0.093450 -0.099938 -0.221152 
ROA  0.681676  1.000000 -0.252581  0.320216  0.336387  0.515723  0.073906 -0.106783 
TQ -0.367204 -0.252581  1.000000  0.064786 -0.228016  0.176167  0.047822 -0.057423 
FS  0.407967  0.320216  0.064786  1.000000  0.202793  0.286564 -0.128138 -0.154776 
LEV  0.512761  0.336387 -0.228016  0.202793  1.000000 -0.034188 -0.009204 -0.335354 
BI  0.093450  0.515723  0.176167  0.286564 -0.034188  1.000000  0.260234 -0.124146 
BS -0.099938  0.073906  0.047822 -0.128138 -0.009204  0.260234  1.000000  0.074113 
BH -0.221152 -0.106783 -0.057423 -0.154776 -0.335354 -0.124146  0.074113  1.000000 
 
Analysis:  
In ROE is strongly correlated with changes in the ROA and LEV whereas negative correlation with BS and TQ 
and vice versa.  
In ROA is strongly correlated with changes in ROE and BI whereas negative correlation with TQ and BH and vice 
versa. 
In TQ is weakly correlated with changes in FS, BI and BS whereas negative correlation with ROE, ROA, LEV 
and BH  
In FS is weakly correlated with changes in TQ, LEV and BI whereas negative correlation with BS and BH and 
vice versa 
In LEV is strongly correlated with changes in ROE whereas negative correlation with TQ, BI, BS and BH and vice 
versa 
In BI is strongly correlated with changes in ROA whereas negative correlation with LEV and BH and vice versa 
In BS is weakly correlated with changes in ROA, TQ, BI wand BH whereas negative correlation with ROE, FS 
and LEV  
In BH is weakly correlated with changes in BS whereas negative correlation with rest of all variables 
 
6)    Conclusion 
This research is assessing working corporate governance and its components with firm’s performance with 15 
listed companies of Fuel and Power Sectors in KSE over the period from 2010 to 2014 were used. 
Based on the finding of the research, following conclusions are dawned: 
Our present findings of the results are support to the prior researches. According to the results of the models are 
corporate governance does not impact or insignificant impact on firms performance such are as ROE, ROA and 
V Coeft. Std. Er      t-Stat Prob.   
C 13.70083 2.849596 4.807991 0.0000 
BI -12.88846 6.007039 -2.145560 0.0353 
BS 3.826625 3.727060 1.026714 0.3080 
BH -67.43553 20.26764 -3.327251 0.0014 
R2 0.163820     M.D.V 12.39120 
Adj. R2 0.128488     S.D.D.V 10.55851 
S.E.O.R 9.856880     A.I.C 7.466075 
S2-res 6898.224     S.C 7.589674 
Log lik-li -275.9778     H-Q.C 7.515427 
F-stat. 4.636642     D-W.S 0.603238 
Prob(F-stat.) 0.005113    
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Tobin’s Q so, research hypothesis is accepted. However, significant or does impact on firm size and leverage so, 
research hypothesis are accepted. 
From overall results are analyzed that association between BH and BS are found negative whereas 
positive association of BI on firms performance. According to Dahya, Dimitrov and McConnell (2008) argue that 
the correlation between firm value and the percentage of independent directors is positively significant, however 
this report shows above the model the significant association between BI and firms performance. In Corporate 
Governance 2002 describe that at least only one independent director should in the public listed company also the 
criteria for independence assessment was very limited and in corporate governance ordinance, 2012 has been 
expanded and one independent director should be obligatory for 1/3rd of the total members of the BOD so that’s 
why board independence is a vital role play in fuel and power sectors in the Pakistan. 
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